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Abstract: The success story of eBay has shown the demand for customer-to-customer 
(C2C) electronic commerce. eBay is a centralized infrastructure with all its scalability 
problems (network bandwidth, server load, availability, etc.). In this paper we argue that 
C2C e-commerce is an application domain that maps naturally onto the emerging field of 
peer-to-peer (P2P) systems simply by its underlying interaction model of customers, i.e., 
peers. This offers the opportunity to take P2P systems beyond mere file sharing systems 
into interesting new application domains. The long-term goal would be to design a fully 
functional decentralized system which resembles eBay without eBay's dedicated, 
centralized infrastructure. Since security (authenticity, non-repudiation, trust, etc.) is key to 
any e-commerce infrastructure, our envisioned P2P e-commerce platform has to address 
these security issues adequately. As the first step in this direction we present an approach 
for a completely decentralized P2P public key infrastructure (PKI) which can serve as the 
basis for higher-level security service. We base it on a statistical approach and present an 
analytical model to quantify its behavior and properties and to provide probabilistic 
guarantees. To justify our claims we provide a first-order analysis and discuss the PKI's 
resilience against various known threats and attack scenarios. 
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systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The demand for customer-to-customer commerce (C2C) has 
been proven by the huge success of eBay. eBay provides a 
centralized trading platform to its customers and offers a 
certain degree of security that business transactions between 
partners, which are unknown to each other, are performed 
properly.  The advantage of eBay's centralized architecture 
is that rules can be enforced easily. However, this turns into 
a severe problem if we switch the viewpoint: In any 
centralized architecture the central entity is a single point of 
failure and a bottleneck in terms of bandwidth and 
computing resources which limits scalability and in turn 
causes high infrastructure requirements. 
For these reasons we argue that a customer-to-customer 
system would map more naturally onto a P2P system by its 
very structure and interaction patterns. However, more 
effort has to be put into the design in order to offer similar 
services and guarantees as a centralized infrastructure. 
There may be additional scepticism about the viability of 
trading high-valued commodities in a P2P commerce 
platform. However, even with centralized solutions, the 
risks are almost equally high that the other customer does 
not deliver what he promises and thus C2C commerce will 
indeed be more popular for trading commodities of 
relatively less value. 
While scalability and fault-tolerance come implicitly with 
P2P infrastructures, as has been proven by successful P2P 
systems such as Kazaa or Gnutella, security guarantees 
similar to centralized architectures are more difficult to 
achieve in a decentralized environment. Many security 
services, for example, authentication of the trading partners, 
rely on the existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI). 
PKIs typically have centralized architectures which 
contradicts the P2P approach and would introduce 
centralization into a decentralized approach again through 
the back door and would defeat the advantages gained from 
decentralization. An alternative would be to use a PGP-like 
“web of trust'” approach. However, it has been shown that 
this concept has several severe shortcomings as we will 
discuss in the next section. Thus we suggest a different 
strategy and propose a decentralized PKI based on a 
statistical (quorum-based) approach that overcomes these 
problems. 
To set the stage we start with a classification and 
discussion of existing PKI approaches. Then we present a 
detailed description of the decentralized PKI architecture we 
propose by discussing all its building blocks and algorithms. 
To justify the validity of our model we then provide a first-
order analysis of the incurred effort and security properties 
of our PKI. We continue with a security analysis of our PKI 
in which we analyze common attacks with respect to our 
approach. This is followed by a discussion of related work, 
which is relatively sparse in this domain, due to the 
pioneering character of our work and we end with our 
conclusions. 
PKI APPROACHES 
This section defines an informal taxonomy to classify 
existing PKI approaches, discusses the main variants, and 
positions our proposed system with respect to this 
classification. 
Taxonomy of PKI approaches 
In the context of data management, current PKIs may be 
classified either as centralized or decentralized. A 
centralized PKI consists of a federation of trusted third 
parties (TTP), so-called certification authorities (CA), for 
example, VeriSign. The TTPs do not participate in the 
interactions of a system but act as facilitators of the 
activities. We omit these centralized solutions from the rest 
of our discussion since they are not in our scope and have 
already been evaluated in great detail, for example, in [16]. 
In decentralized PKIs the public key infrastructure is 
maintained by the participants themselves without using 
central control and special roles such as CAs. Essentially 
decentralized PKIs can be categorized by the strategy that is 
applied to discover peers which store the public key of an 
entity and how much these peers can be trusted.  Three main 
subclasses of decentralized PKIs exist: web-of-trust, 
statistical (quorum-based) approaches, and hybrid 
approaches.  
In the web-of-trust model a participant of the system 
knows the public keys of some other peers, and considers 
this knowledge sacrosanct. It also relies on some of these 
peers (with a possibly varying degree of trust) to certify the 
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public key of other peers. Then to obtain a trustworthy 
public key of another peer a path in the peer acquaintance 
(trust) graph has to be found. This graph, the so-called web-
of-trust, is formed by a simple transitive trust rule: If PA 
trusts that KB is PB's public key, and also relies (personally 
determined) on PB to certify a third party's public key, then 
PA will believe that KC is PC's public key if PB certifies it.  
PGP [12] and its variants belong to this group. PGP 
implicitly exploits the small world phenomenon of social 
acquaintance that is observed in the trust (certificate) graph 
[5] to create a web-of-trust of peers' public keys. 
Consequently, it obliterates the need of central authorities, 
and has been enormously successful as a freely available 
decentralized public key infrastructure. However, the 
strength of a trust chain is determined by its weakest link, 
and hence a simple transitive trust model as PGP's is highly 
vulnerable and thus unreliable.  
Statistical (quorum-based) approaches obtain the public 
key information from many peers and if it is possible to 
form a quorum the public key is considered authentic. We 
will elaborate on this type of PKIs in the next section where 
we describe our approach. The essential idea behind a 
statistical approach is to have multiple random and thus 
presumably independent sources (peers) which replicate the 
public key information, and to retrieve the information from 
a random subset of these replicas. This requires an efficient, 
decentralized indexing infrastructure. The approach 
presented in this paper belongs to the group of statistical 
approaches and we use our P2P storage management system 
P-Grid [4] for efficient indexing and retrieval of public key 
information. However, it should be emphasized that any 
other P2P system with guarantees similar to the ones of P-
Grid may be used, and thus our proposal is generic and 
could be adapted to other decentralized overlay networks.  
In hybrid approaches public key information is obtained 
from many, preferably independent peers, and then a 
weighted quorum is formed depending on the relative trust 
level of the information providing peers.  
Discussion of decentralized PKI approaches 
As stated above the two dimensions relevant to 
decentralized PKIs are the strategy to discover peers which 
have the required public key and the trustworthiness of the 
information (public key) obtained from these peers. A 
fundamental difference between the web-of-trust and the 
statistical approaches is the strategy in which the two 
dimensions are navigated, i.e., the mechanism by which the 
relevant information is obtained: random walks in a trust 
graph or systematic, efficient access to relevant information, 
and then using a quorum (possibly weighted) for reliability 
(trust). 
The inefficiency in web-of-trust based approaches arises 
primarily from the fact that information is searched through 
random walks. While random walks are the best (though 
inefficient) strategy to discover information in structure-less 
P2P systems such as Gnutella, structured P2P systems 
support efficient searches, inserts, and updates which can be 
exploited to build statistical or hybrid PKIs efficiently.  
Another reason in favour of using structured P2P systems as 
a base technology is that a quorum-based approach in 
structure-less P2P systems is impractical because searches 
depend on flooding (and thus are inefficient), and also 
maintenance (inserts or updates) has high overhead. 
Apart from the inefficiency of random walks, web-of-trust 
based approaches have further drawbacks: 
 
1. Path discovery is inefficient because the effort is 
not shared, and has high, unbounded latency. 
 
2. Web-of-trust approaches have primarily been 
applied for privacy purposes. To completely 
believe in a person's public key, it has to be 
obtained offline or the public keys must have 
been certified by a known and trusted entity 
(person). It is thus premature to assume, 
particularly in the absence of any quantifiable 
guarantees, that the web-of-trust model that 
worked well for email privacy can be converted 
into an all-purpose decentralized public key 
infrastructure.  
 
3. Web-of-trust models fail to use the collective 
knowledge of the whole population, but use only 
information available within a small number of 
transitive hops, determined by time to live, in the 
connectivity graph. However, the ultimate 
purpose of a decentralized PKI should be to 
provide a way to establish identity beyond 
reasonable doubt. Web-of-trust models cannot 
guarantee this because transitive paths are not 
guaranteed. 
 
4. Finally, since the trust on other peers' 
certification is essentially ad-hoc, the web-of-
trust is susceptible to the malicious behaviour of 
a few or even a single peer. 
 
An extension of PGP's original approach is to include 
multiple paths of trust transitivity [15] to improve the 
reliability of authentication. Nevertheless, the reliability of 
such approaches is limited because of intersecting paths, 
which requires authentication metrics [15] to quantify the 
reliability of such multiple paths. Thus it consumes a lot of 
network and computational resources, worsened by the fact 
that there are no guarantees for the existence of multiple 
independent paths, nor any mechanism to discover them 
efficiently exists. This approach again is an attempt to 
navigate the two dimensions mentioned at the beginning of 
this section in the wrong order, since random walks are used 
for information discovery with the assumption of finding 
multiple paths, trying to exploit the power-law distribution 
of trust graphs.  A further weakness of this approach is that 
the multiple paths and the metrics need to be evaluated at 
each peer, and thus the effort is not shared.  
Based on the above discussions we argue that statistical 
and hybrid approaches are preferable over web-of-trust 
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approaches. Their efficient implementation which was a 
major problem for a long time due to the lack of adequate 
infrastructures for reliable, distributed information 
maintenance is now facilitated by structured P2P systems. 
The application of structured P2P system for PKIs based on 
statistical or hybrid approaches avoids the inefficiencies of 
the web-of-trust model and additionally provides 
quantifiable probabilistic guarantees which are not available 
for web-of-trust approaches. 
A QUORUM-BASED DECENTRALIZED PKI 
A prerequisite for decentralized PKIs is an efficient and 
reliable distributed information access structure that 
facilitates efficient updates and replication, tolerates 
frequently disconnected peers and accounts for 
uncooperative peers. This is not possible in unstructured 
P2P systems like Gnutella. Thus the so far pre-dominant 
“web-of-trust” model employs random walks (basically 
flooding) for exploring the trust graph of a P2P network. 
But with the recent development of efficient access 
structures such as CAN, Chord, Freenet, or P-Grid, it is 
indeed possible to realize more systematic models, rather 
than relying on the ad-hoc “web-of-trust” model, for which 
no probabilistic guarantees are available so far. Our 
approach to decentralized PKI is based on P-Grid. Thus we 
start with a brief introduction of P-Grid [4], before 
elaborating the details of our PKI approach.  
P-Grid 
P-Grid is a distributed data structure based on the principles 
of distributed hash tables (DHT) [13]. As any DHT 
approach P-Grid is based on the idea of associating peers 
with data keys from a key space K. Without constraining 
general applicability we will only consider binary keys in 
the following. 
Each peer p ∈ Peers in P-Grid is associated with a binary 
key from K. We denote this key by path(p) and call it the 
path of the peer. This key determines which data keys the 
peer has to manage, i.e., the keys in K that have path(p) as 
prefix. In order to ensure that the complete search space is 
covered by peers we require that the set of peers' paths is 
complete, i.e., for every prefix spre of the path of a peer p 
there exists a peer p' such that path(p')=spre or there exist 
peers p0 and p1 such that spre0 is a prefix of path(p0) and 
spre1 is a prefix of path(p1). Naturally, one of the two peers 
p0 and p1 will be p itself in that case. Put differently, a P-
Grid is constructed as a distributed binary tree. 
Completeness is guaranteed by P-Grid's construction 
algorithm. Additionally the construction algorithm ensures 
that a P-Grid will converge to a state where it is prefix-free 
for optimal load balancing, i.e., for peers p0 and p1 we have 
¬ (path(p0) ⊆ path(p1) ∨  path(p1) ⊆ path(p0)), where s ⊆ s' 
denotes the prefix relationship among strings s and s'. 
Algorithms for construction and maintenance and for load-
balancing of a P-Grid have been introduced in [2].  
To provide robustness in the presence of peer failures and 
distributed search workload, each path is covered by 
multiple peers (replicas). For searches each peer maintains 
routing tables which are defined as (partial) functions ref: 
Peers × N → {Peers} with the properties 
1. ref(p,l) is defined for all p ∈ Peers and l ∈ N 
with 1 ≤ l ≤ |path(p)| 
2. ref(p,l) ⊆ Peerss1s2…s{l-1(1-sl) with path(p)=s1s2...sl-1 
sl ...sk, k ≥ l 
where Peerst = { p ∈ Peers | t ⊆ path(p)} for t ∈ K. 
Having multiple references at each level l again is 
necessary to guarantee robustness of the data structure. We 
denote by r the maximum number of references maintained 
at each level. The search algorithm for locating data keys 
indexed by a P-Grid is defined as follows: Each peer p ∈ 
Peers is associated with a location loc(p) (IP address). 
Searches can start at any peer. Peer p knows the locations of 
the peers referenced by ref(p,l), but not of other peers.  Thus 
the function ref(p,l) provides the necessary routing 
information to forward search requests to other peers in case 
the searched key does not match the peer identifier. Let t ∈ 
K be the searched data key and let the search start at p ∈ P.  
Then search is defined by the following recursive algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 1 Search in P-Grid: search(t, loc(p)) 
1:  if path(p) ⊆ t then 
2:      return(loc(p)); 
3:  else 
4:      determine maximal l such that t1...tl-1(1-tl) ⊆ path(p); 
5:      r = randomly selected element from ref(p,l); 
6:      return (search(t, loc(r))); 
7:  end if 
 
Due to the definition of ref, the function search will 
always find the location of a peer at which the search can 
continue (use of completeness). With each invocation of 
search(t, loc(p)) the length of the common prefix of path(p) 
and t increases at least by one. Therefore the algorithm 
always terminates. The average search cost irrespective of 
the data distribution is O(log n) with n being the number of 
leaves in the P-Grid tree. 
Unlike most contemporary P2P systems P-Grid supports 
updates of the stored, replicated data using a push/pull 
gossiping mechanism which provides probabilistic success 
and consistency guarantees even in unreliable network 
environments [8].  
A decentralized PKI based on P-Grid 
Each peer p is uniquely identified by a universally unique 
identifier (UUID) Idp which is generated once when a peer 
joins the P-Grid community, by applying a 
cryptographically secure hash function to some random 
data. Routing tables hold only these identifiers. Each peer p 
additionally has a cache that holds mappings of peers' Idp to 
their physical addresses addrp it already knows ((Idi, addri, 
TSi), where TSi denotes a time-stamp) in order to be able to 
communicate with other peers. Since disconnections of 
peers may lead to changing IP addresses, correct mappings 
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need to be maintained which is provided inside P-Grid itself 
as described in [1] using P-Grid's update functionality [8].  
At bootstrap, each peer p also generates a private/public key 
pair Dp/Ep. Then our algorithm for building a decentralized 
PKI on top of P-Grid works as given below.  
In the following discussion, Rmin4 ≤ Rmin3 ≤ Rmin2 ≤ Rmin1, 
Tout2 > Tout1 are design parameters determining the level of 
security and influencing the performance. We will use these 
for our analysis in the next section of the effort required and 
performance (probabilistic) offered by our system. For 
simplicity we will consider Rmin4 = Rmin3 without loss of 
generality of the results of our analysis. 
 
Bootstrap (a new peer p joins the P-Grid) 
 
1. p determines its current IP address and generates 
Idp, Dp/Ep. 
 
2. (Idp, addrp, Ep, TSp, Dp(Idp, addrp, Ep, TSp)) (for  
brevity denoted as tuple in the following) is 
inserted into P-Grid   by p using Idp as the key 
(TSp is a timestamp used to prevent replay 
attacks, Dp(x) means that the request is signed by 
p). The Id/IP mapping is inserted in the P-Grid to 
be able to handle possible changes of physical 
addresses and has been described and analyzed in 
[9].  Inserting in P-Grid means that the request is 
routed to a responsible replica peer, pi ∈ ℜp. ℜp 
is the set of replicas responsible for storing 
information about peer p. If Idp already exists in 
the P-Grid (though this is very improbable) p 
generates a new Idp and repeats this step. 
 
3. p repeats the insertion operation at Rmin1 random 
and distinct P-Grid peers, so that the insertion 
request reaches an expected Rmin2 distinct 
replicas. 
 
4. All pi that receive the insert(tuple) message 
initiate update(tuple,pi) among their replicas ℜp. 
All replicas, including the ones that originated 
such updates locally store the tuple only if they 
receive and can form a quorum of Rmin3 ≤ Rmin2 
distinct update messages within Tout1 time. Peers 
who received the original insert then send a 
confirmation to p. This of course holds for the 
peers/replicas that are online during the update 
operation. Those peers that come online later use 
a quorum-based pull strategy to get an up-to-date 
view [8]. If after Tout1 since receiving the first 
update message, Rmin3 distinct messages have not 
been received, the peers discard the information. 
In the absence of Byzantine/malicious peers it 
would have been sufficient to make a single 
insert in P-Grid, since the update mechanism 
would have updated all replicas. However, 
malicious peers may initiate updates with false 
information. Since search and insert requests are 
routed to random replicas, we use multiple 
requests and then a quorum to address this 
properly. 
 
5. As a result of the previous steps the tuple will be 
physically stored at peers in ℜp.  Based on the 
randomized algorithms that P-Grid uses we can 
assume that the individual replicas pi ∈ ℜp are 
independent and they collude or behave 
Byzantine only to a degree that can be handled by 
existing algorithms. 
 
6. If p receives Rmin4 ≤ Rmin3 confirmations (within 
some Tout2 > Tout1), it is convinced 
(probabilistically) that its public key has been 
replicated amply for fault tolerance. Otherwise p 
generates a new Idp and retries the insert process. 
Since only a new peer entering the P2P system 
needs to conduct the bootstrap phase, it is 
irrelevant which identity is successfully inserted. 
Also, generation and re-insertion of a new 
identity will be required only in the event of a 
distributed denial of service attack by malicious 
peers, more on which is discussed in a later 
section. 
 
Peer startup (a peer p rejoins) 
 
p starts up and checks whether its addrp has changed.  If 
yes, it initiates an update of its new physical address (signed 
with its private key). The complete algorithm for update 
along with the cost incurred and its reliability can be found 
in [1, 9]. This step is necessary in order to make sure that 
the routing tables are correct. 
 
Operation phase 
 
This phase denotes the standard operation, i.e., p is up and 
running, has registered an up-to-date mapping of its 
identity/physical address (Idp, addrp, TSp) and is ready to 
process query and update requests, for example, for other 
peers' public keys, physical address, or other additional 
information that may be present in the P-Grid. Both queries 
and updates need to be routed to at least one replica peer 
responsible for the concerned key space. 
 
1. p receives a request Q from a peer q. 
 
2. In case p can satisfy Q the result is returned to q. 
Otherwise p finds out which peer pf to forward 
the query to and retrieves (Idpf, addrpf, Epf, TSpf) 
for this purpose. 
 
3. p generates a random number ρ, contacts pf and 
sends Epf(ρ). As an answer pf must send 
(Dpf(Epf(ρ))) and p can check whether Dpf(Epf(ρ)) 
= ρ. If yes, pf is correctly identified, i.e., p really 
talks to the peer it intends to, and Q  is forwarded 
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to pf, which means that the processing of Q at 
peer p was completed successfully. Otherwise the 
following steps are performed. 
 
4. If step 3 failed, then pf may have a new IP 
address or be offline (the case that somebody 
tries to impersonate pf is covered implicitly by 
the signature check above) and p may either use 
an alternative routing reference (P-Grid routing 
tables hold multiple entries for each level) or 
send a query to P-Grid to retrieve the current 
addrpf using Idpf as the key (the detailed strategy 
is presented and analyzed in [1]. 
 
5. p collects all answers ti = (Idpf, Epf, addrpf, TSpf, 
Dpf(Idpf, Epf, addrpf, TSpf)) it receives from the pj 
∈ ℜpf. If extended security is required then the pj 
should sign their answers, i.e., send (ti, Dpj(ti))). p 
has to collect at least Rmin3 answers to detect 
misinformed or malicious peers, i.e., checks 
whether a certain quorum of the answers is 
identical (Rmin3 is defined by each individual p 
according to its local requirements for 
trustworthiness). Otherwise the query is repeated 
a certain number of times before aborting. 
Forming a quorum can be avoided if peers store 
the public keys Epf of other peers and decide to 
trust in them after they have done a certain 
number of (quorum-based) queries for Epf that 
have resulted in identical answers. If p already 
knows Epf  and trusts it then it can immediately 
check the validity of the answer by Epf(Dpf(Idpf, 
Epf, addrpf, TSpf)).Idpf = ti.Idpf. 
 
6. Now p can proceed with step 3. In case this is 
successful p enters (Idpf, addrpf, Epf, TSpf)) in its 
local cache. 
 
Any information, most importantly public keys in our 
context, may be accessed and maintained in the way 
described above. The approach of a decentralized PKI based 
on P-Grid is efficient because the basic operations such as 
search or insert in P-Grid take O(log n) messages to 
discover one random replica responsible for the relevant 
key. Since the routing process is randomized, attacks are 
hard to conduct and the reliability of results can be 
established by quorum-based techniques. 
ANALYSIS 
The costs of locating public key information reliably are a 
key factor for the usability of our approach which we 
analyze below, i.e., the costs to locate Rmin2 distinct replicas 
responsible for the particular key, and forming a quorum of 
at least Rmin3. In the analysis we use the following notations: 
|ℜp| denotes the total number of replicas and Ron of these are 
online with their correct physical address known to other 
peers who refer to them. Note that it can be any Ron of the 
|ℜp| replicas, since the update mechanism [8] provides 
probabilistic consistency guarantee for the online replicas. 
All requests need to be routed to any one of these 
responsible and online replicas. The effort to route an 
individual request successfully in the presence of stale 
caches and unavailable peers has been analyzed and shown 
to be efficient in [9] and [1] and is logarithmic. Update costs 
in P-Grid with probabilistic success and consistency 
guarantees in the presence of peer disconnections at a 
reasonable overhead have been analyzed in [8] and are 
linear in the number of replicas. Thus we only need to 
analyze the expected number of independent requests Rmin1 
in order to reach Rmin2 distinct replicas to form a Rmin3 
quorum, where Rmin3 ≤ Rmin2 ≤ Rmin1, out of Ron online 
replicas, assuming that Ron ≥  Rmin2.  
For the analysis, we assume that the network topology is 
relatively static, such that Ron does not change dramatically 
during a single query propagation. This is a realistic 
assumption because queries in P-Grid require O(log n) 
messages, i.e., require a very short period of time. Thus the 
network topology may indeed be assumed to be quasi-static. 
Further, apart from replicas going off-line, replicas come 
online as well, thus the variation of Ron within a small 
period of time can be neglected for a first order analysis. 
Under these assumptions, we need to determine the 
expected number of requests at random peers in P-Grid, 
such that responses are obtained from Rmin2 distinct replicas 
out of the Ron online replicas. This problem may be reduced 
to coupon collector's problem [11], such that Rmin2 distinct 
coupons need to be collected out of Ron possible coupons.  
Under the assumption that all the online replicas are equally 
likely to be reached, which is guaranteed by P-Grid's 
randomized load balancing construction and routing 
algorithms, the expected number of requests Rmin1 is then a 
function of Ron and Rmin2, represented as Rmin1(Ron,Rmin2) 
required for Rmin2 distinct responses, and can be formalized 
as [11]: 
Rmin1(Ron, Rmin2) = 
 Ron(HarmonicNumber(Ron) - HarmonicNumber(Ron - Rmin2)) 
Figure 1 shows the total expected number of P-Grid 
requests Rmin1 required to reach Rmin2 distinct replicas out of 
Ron online replicas (for Ron = 20 and Rmin2 is varied between 
0 and 20). 
 
Figure 1: Expected effort (Rmin1) for contacting Rmin2 
distinct replicas among 20 online replicas 
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Given that a peer is malicious with probability m, the 
probability of successfully forming a quorum, i.e., at least 
Rmin3 correct replies are obtained is 
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The probability of a successful distributed denial-of-
service (DDOS) attack, i.e., an Rmin3 quorum could not be 
formed, assuming that malicious peers act independently 
and each returns false information or does not reply at all, or 
malicious peers successfully persuade an enquirer with a 
false information (with all malicious peers collaborating and 
thus replying the same false information), then is 
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Since peers are assigned a key space randomly in P-Grid, 
it is unlikely that all malicious replicas collaborate, and thus 
DDOS attacks are more probable. 
Figure 2 shows the probability of successfully forming a 
quorum of at least 11 matching replies where 20 replicas are 
online, and thus can possibly be contacted under varying 
percentages of malicious peers. 
Figure 2: Probability of successfully forming a quorum 
with varying 
The probability of a successful DDOS attack is 
complementary to the probability of forming a quorum. As 
can be seen in the figure, there is a phase transition, such 
that for a low percentage of malicious peers (in this 
example, if m ≤ 0.25), the probability of successfully 
forming a quorum is close to one, and with increasing 
percentage of malicious peers, performance degrades 
rapidly and susceptibility to attacks increases.  This example 
demonstrates that our mechanism provides quantifiable 
performance figures for providing authentication beyond 
reasonable doubt in a predominantly well-behaved P2P 
society.  
POSSIBLE ATTACKS 
Bootstrap phase 
The most common attack during the bootstrap phase will be 
that a malicious replica inserts a wrong tuple locally instead 
of inserting the correct tuple, and sends an update message 
using this false tuple. By requiring a quorum at all well-
behaved peers (replicas) we ensure that in a predominantly 
well-behaved P2P society, the correct information is stored.  
If the percentage of malicious users is higher well-
behaved peers may fail to form a quorum. This can be 
circumvented by repeating the insert operation with a newly 
generated Idp. Since routing is randomized, it is likely that 
several repeated attempts will lead to eventual success.  
The worst case will be that a group of collaborating 
malicious users are able to successfully insert a wrong 
public key into the P-Grid on behalf of a peer p's identity. In 
this case, the peer p actually has nothing to loose (since it is 
new, it has no identity or reputation yet), and will simply 
have to abandon that identity, and restart with a new one, or 
maybe, it will be unable to join the system. Philosophically 
speaking, it is not a bad option either, since most members 
of the system have to be malicious and collaborating in this 
case, so joining may not be a good idea anyway. 
Peer startup phase 
Here a peer p has successfully registered its correct public 
key in P-Grid. When p rejoins the network, it has to 
communicate with other peers, and p's identity will be 
authenticated using its public key. Here, a possible attack 
can be done if a peer pv queries P-Grid to verify p's public 
key. Malicious peers may provide false information, thus 
trying to deny service. But with multiple queries starting at 
random peers (e.g., from pv's routing table), this attack can 
be thwarted, particularly because queries are routed 
randomly to different replicas. Thus a quorum-based 
authentication will again work in a predominantly well-
behaved P2P society. 
Operational phase 
During the operational phase, a peer p needs to first 
authenticate the identity of another peer pc by conducting 
queries for pc's public key.  After authenticating the identity, 
queries related to reputation information can again be made 
in a similar fashion. Also, after concluding business, digital 
signatures may be used as proof, thus providing non-
repudiation. Apart from attacks during insert or query 
operations, as discussed above, impersonation attacks may 
also be attempted. 
Impersonation is prevented using public key based 
authentication, but depends on the percentage of malicious 
peers in the system. If a significant population of peers are 
malicious collaborate, impersonation can not be ruled out 
(see previous section). 
RELATED WORK 
Most of the work done in the context of decentralized PKIs 
has used PGP-like [12] web-of-trust models, trying to 
exploit small-world certificate graphs [5], some of which 
use computationally intensive authentication metrics [15]. 
We elaborated the drawbacks of such approaches already in 
detail in the section on PKI approaches and advocated the 
use of a statistical/hybrid model based on structured P2P 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
m
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Probability of forming a quorum
8    KARL ABERER, ANWITAMAN DATTA, AND MANFRED HAUSWIRTH 
systems instead. To the best of our knowledge we have 
pioneered decentralized PKIs which employ statistic/hybrid 
approaches on the basis of structured P2P systems. 
Our proposed decentralized PKI is generic, and in 
principle our approach could also work on top of other 
structured P2P systems. However, careful analysis is 
required for each of these systems to assess their suitability. 
For example, our approach would not work with the existing 
versions of CAN [14] or Chord [17] because they do not 
address the issue of updates, which is essential for our PKI 
approach. Freenet [7] may serve as a possible platform but 
would again require a detailed analysis whether it can 
provide sufficient guarantees especially with respect to 
update propagation to cached copies of information. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we advocated the need of a distributed PKI for 
P2P systems and presented our approach based on the 
efficient search mechanism provided by our structured P2P 
system P-Grid. In unstructured P2P systems like Gnutella, 
web-of-trust is the only available option, which is inherently 
inefficient and ad-hoc, probabilistic guarantees cannot be 
provided and costs are difficult to estimate. In contrast we 
employ the statistical PKI approach which facilitates 
sharing of effort, has low latency and guaranteed results, 
and provides mathematically provable probabilistic 
guarantees. We also provided arguments proving that our 
approach is resistant to various kinds of attacks.  
Despite several advantages of the statistical approach, the 
fact remains that the web-of-trust approach is already in 
wide-spread use and hence future systems will possibly 
employ a hybrid web-of-trust/statistical approach. In fact, 
the routing in P-Grid itself may be thought to be very 
similar to traversal in trust graphs but more efficient. 
Incorporating web-of-trust in our approach is simple by 
weighting routing references according to trust in other 
peers, by using approaches such as [3] or [6]. Thus our work 
may also serve as the basis for more efficient web-of-trust 
approaches based on structured P2P systems. We discuss 
resistance of our scheme to several possible attacks, but real 
life experiences are still needed to identify other potential 
attacks and make our PKI resilient to such attacks. 
Our work on identity management solely by the 
participating peers rather than relying on trusted third 
parties is a step towards enabling e-commerce in a totally 
P2P way. It paves way to support other services like 
reputation management apart from ensuring reliable 
functioning of the P2P system itself. For example, our 
approach would integrate well with work in the context of 
decentralized trust management, such as [3] and [6], which 
often require an extrinsic mechanism for authentication, but 
do not explicitly address this issue. 
Also other domains may benefit from our approach, for 
example, the emerging area of web services: Each web 
service may be considered as an “entity” or “peer” which 
cooperate in a P2P way. Then service discovery [10], as 
well as keeping track of their quality and integrity can be 
achieved in a completely decentralized manner by our 
approach, enabling reliable inter-operation without the need 
of heavy-weight infrastructures. 
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